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Microsimulation study of the release of pneumonic plague and smallpox on a 
synthetic civilian population 
Abstract 
The confrontation in Syria is a cause for concern over the use of chemical and biological weapons. There 
have been reports of the use of chemical weapons including Sarin. While both sides accuse each other, 
there is very little ground evidence at this time (August 2013) to substantiate claims or to determine who 
is involved. Their use would demonstrate a total disregard for civilian casualties and UN conventions. 
Syria is thought to have stockpiles of a number of agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia, 
botulinium, smallpox and cholera (Gordon, 2007). Some groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda might also have 
access to some of these through their terrorist networks. If chemical weapons have been used by either 
side, then the potential use of biological weapons cannot be disregarded. Of concern is whether the 
response to an attack involving a single agent would be the same as when more than one agent is used. 
While there are a number of papers on the management of both smallpox and plague (Halloran, (2002), 
Rani et al, (2004)), there are few, if any, which discuss joint infection or the likely confounding factors that 
will affect outcomes in their post attack management. In this paper we explore the application of 
microsimulation modelling of a joint attack on a civilian population using plague and smallpox as an 
example. The literature suggests that plague affects the innate immune system by suppressing cytokine 
responses while smallpox activates the cytokine response. The possible interaction between the two 
diseases in people who are infected with both diseases is examined and its effect on the spread of 
disease and number of deaths. The simulations involve a population of 1250 people based on NSW 
statistics for households and work. The structure of a community model of social mixing is briefly 
discussed, over which a multi-infection model is imposed that accounts for varying infectivity in different 
stages of each disease as well as confinement to home as each disease progresses. A number of 
simulations were run, assuming 10% immunity to both diseases, to establish a baseline for each disease 
in the community. Further simulations where both are released together with delay of the introduction of 
plague compared to smallpox of 0 and 35 days respectively. The strength of the interaction by smallpox 
on plague deaths was also investigated. The outcome is complex as the number of deaths is dependent 
on the delay in the release of plague and varies according to the number of people progressing through 
the active release locations that can infect them. Additionally confinement to their household during the 
later stages of both diseases reduces the number of susceptible people in the general community 
although it still allows for spread to other household members. It was found that the number of joint 
infections was about 10% of the total number infected and that the reduction in deaths from plague where 
the two infections were present also depended on how many smallpox cases were at the correct stage of 
development compared to the plague infection. We believe that the use of microsimulation has a benefit 
in that many of the human factors that affect delay in control and hence the size of any epidemic can be 
easily incorporated into the simulation without affecting the other components of the simulation. For 
example, vaccine and drug supply can be added as additional peeps that move to hospitals or doctors' 
surgeries and then interact with the human population through creation of additional states based on 
these locations. Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing 
epidemic spread as well as assessing current WHO guidelines for each disease. The intention is to 
develop well understood protocols for application both within and outside of conflict areas. Progress on 
this will be reported at the conference. 
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Abstract:  
The confrontation in Syria is a cause for concern over the use of chemical and biological weapons. There 
have been reports of the use of chemical weapons including Sarin. While both sides accuse each other, there 
is very little ground evidence at this time (August 2013) to substantiate claims or to determine who is 
involved.  Their use would demonstrate a total disregard for civilian casualties and UN conventions.  Syria is 
thought to have stockpiles of a number of agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia, botulinium, smallpox 
and cholera (Gordon, 2007).  Some groups sympathetic to Al Qaeda might also have access to some of these 
through their terrorist networks. If chemical weapons have been used by either side, then the potential use of 
biological weapons cannot be disregarded.  
Of concern is whether the response to an attack involving a single agent would be the same as when more 
than one agent is used. While there are a number of papers on the management of both smallpox and plague 
(Halloran, (2002), Rani et al, (2004)), there are few, if any, which discuss joint infection or the likely 
confounding factors that will affect outcomes in their post attack management.  In this paper we explore the 
application of microsimulation modelling of a joint attack on a civilian population using plague and smallpox 
as an example. The literature suggests that plague affects the innate immune system by suppressing cytokine 
responses while smallpox activates the cytokine response. The possible interaction between the two diseases 
in people who are infected with both diseases is examined and its effect on the spread of disease and number 
of deaths.  
The simulations involve a population of 1250 people based on NSW statistics for households and work. The 
structure of a community model of social mixing is briefly discussed, over which a multi-infection model is 
imposed that accounts for varying infectivity in different stages of each disease as well as confinement to 
home as each disease progresses. A number of simulations were run, assuming 10% immunity to both 
diseases, to establish a baseline for each disease in the community. Further simulations where both are 
released together with delay of the introduction of plague compared to smallpox of 0 and 35 days 
respectively. The strength of the interaction by smallpox on plague deaths was also investigated.  
The outcome is complex as the number of deaths is dependent on the delay in the release of plague and varies 
according to the number of people progressing through the active release locations that can infect them.  
Additionally confinement to their household during the later stages of both diseases reduces the number of 
susceptible people in the general community although it still allows for spread to other household members. 
It was found that the number of joint infections was about 10% of the total number infected and that the 
reduction in deaths from plague where the two infections were present also depended on how many smallpox 
cases were at the correct stage of development compared to the plague infection.    
We believe that the use of microsimulation has a benefit in that many of the human factors that affect delay 
in control and hence the size of any epidemic can be easily incorporated into the simulation without affecting 
the other components of the simulation. For example, vaccine and drug supply can be added as additional 
peeps that move to hospitals or doctors’ surgeries and then interact with the human population through 
creation of additional states based on these locations.  
Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing epidemic spread as well as 
assessing current WHO guidelines for each disease. The intention is to develop well understood protocols for 
application both within and outside of conflict areas. Progress on this will be reported at the conference.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The current conflict in Syria has raised the serious issue of the use of chemical and biological weapons on 
civilian populations. Reports in the media have intimated that chemical weapons have been used in the 
conflict whilst urging caution in the interpretation of these reports. The more serious risk, because it has the 
potential to spread rapidly outside the conflict area, is the use of biological weapons. Syria is thought to have 
stockpiles of a number of agents including anthrax, plague, tularaemia, botulinium, smallpox and cholera 
(Gordon, 2007). These may also be available to other groups but a counterview suggests that biological 
weapons might not have been fully developed and non-state groups would not have the technology to home 
develop such weapons (Leitenberg, 2005).  While the quality and viability of these stockpiles are unknown, 
and the difficulties in weaponising them documented, both state and non-state actors, through their state 
sponsors, might also have access to these weapons. 
If their use is a credible possibility it raises the question of how release in a conflict zone can be countered 
effectively, particularly as refugee camps have extremely high population densities. Local and international 
response agencies will be stretched by a biological epidemic occurring in the context of other conflict-related 
issues. The principle impact will be on their ability to contact-trace cases to control the epidemic. Similarly, 
supplies of anti-bacterials and vaccines may not be readily available, necessitating their importation from 
international stockpiles and delaying their application. There have been several numerical studies of the 
spread and control of smallpox and plague, such as Halloran, (2002) and Rani et al, (2004), where the authors 
have used stochastic methods either to evaluate intervention strategies for control of outbreaks or to estimate 
the number of infectids
1
 hidden from authorities in a community once the disease outbreak had occurred.  
Intervention strategies tended to be modelled on common procedures for tracing, vaccination and isolation of 
contacts.  While many of these recommendations may work well in Western, non-conflict situations, conflict 
areas have problems that delay surveillance, delay access to medication and restrict the quantity and quality 
of trained staff. In addition the presentation of more than one disease may confound treatments. 
In this paper we present development of our microsimulation framework, Simulacron, (Keep, 2012) to multi-
infections with a preliminary investigation into the building of a model for studying the impact of multiple 
biological weapons releases on a population. In the work reported here we have used plague and smallpox as 
two indicative and plausible biological weapons.  
2. SIMULATION OF MULTI-INFECTION IN A COMMUNITY 
Three essential components are required to simulate multi-infection spread within a community at the level 
of the individual.  
First, a description of the community though which the infection will spread. This includes breaking down a 
population into age- and work-based compartments. The community model used in this study is based on the 
2011 census data for NSW (ABS, 2012) and employment statistics for NSW (ABS, 2012a).
2
 Each member of 
the population is assigned to a household that matches NSW housing statistics and to a location, such as a 
school or place of work. These locations are associated with one of six compartments that are used to assign 
schedules for each individual: infants, primary school and secondary school children, full time employed, 
part time employed and unemployed including retirees. Workplace structures, like their household 
counterparts, conform to the overall industry sector statistics. 
Second, a model of social mixing that emulates the complex patterns of locational behavior such as going to 
work, school or eating out at lunch or dinner. In the simulation this mixing occurs through a hierarchical 
structure of daily and weekly schedules. A daily schedule is chosen at random from a list of potential 
schedules that is dependent on the type of person and the day of the week and these are then combined into a 
weekly schedule. These selections for example take account of days off or sick days for full time employed 
or the sport activities of children on the weekend. Each daily schedule randomly selects the timing of events 
within time periods during the day, such as the start of work or lunch, and the place where this occurs. 
Individuals are moved by teleportation at each event time.
3
 Figure 1 is an example of a daily schedule for full 
time work over a day. At each event time, a person has a choice of alternative activities which are preselected 
                                                          
1
 An infectid is a person who has been infected with a disease. 
2
 A NSW community was chosen for convenience to progress understanding of the disease processes 
involved. Conflict areas, however, occur all over the world and are not confined to places like Syria; for 
example the Cronulla riots in NSW indicate that NSW is not immune. 
3
 A more detailed transport model involving path tracing, though available as a module within Simulacron, is 
not used in this study. 
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randomly for execution during the simulation. Complex mixing patterns occur from these very simple 
constructs and these patterns mimic typical social behaviours. 
Third, a multi-infection module that allows spread of diseases through the community. Each infection is 
implemented as a chain model through six infection states (Green et al, 2011). As contact time is explicitly 
modeled through the social mixing process, a probability of infection (infection chance) is used to spread the 
disease and a probability of recovery allows progress to a state of either immunity or death. One innovation is 
the ability to specify the infection probability as a relative force of infection (infection strength) by infectids 
as shown by equation 1. 
       
  
  
∑    
 
              eq(1) 
Where AIC is the infection chance at a susceptible target with infection chance, TIC. Δt is the tick time interval 
and tI is average infectious time. SIj is the infection strength of an infectious peep, j, with a compatible 
infection mask within the cell. The sum is over all such infectious peeps. Infection is determined by selecting 
a [0, 1) uniform random variate, and comparing it to AIC.  If the random number is less than AIC, infection 
spreads to the target peep. 
The infection source is a biological weapon which can either be dropped randomly into an area or taken by a 
person to a specific area of release. In this study we have randomly selected locations from the workplace 
locations to emulate the former release mode rather than the latter which would tend to be targeted at specific 
high density locations for maximal effect. The weapon source has its infection strength increased compared 
to a natural outbreak of the disease in order to simulate an aerosolized weapon infecting individuals while 
subsequent spread between individuals will be similar to natural outbreaks.   
 
 
Figure 1 An example of a daily schedule.  
 
Figure 2 The State system for allowing interaction between Plague (YP) and Smallpox (VM) 
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As plague has evolved to suppress the production of cytokines by the innate immune response (Li et al, 2008) 
and smallpox promotes cytokine response (Fenner et al, 2013) there is the possibility that infection with both 
diseases may alter the recovery outcomes, as the innate immune system works in opposite directions for the 
two diseases. The use of additional states of infection extends the multi-infection module to allow 
interactions between the infections. Figure 2 shows the basic infection states and their function. The potential 
interaction is investigated in this paper. Triggers on change of infection state are used to place individuals 
into states where the infections can interact within a person either increasing or decreasing the recovery rate, 
depending on which infection occurred first. These triggers are also used to confine individuals to one of the 
bedrooms in their house. While other options such as hospitalisation are possible, they have not been 
modelled in this work. The actual model used is more complex than that shown in Figure 2: additional states 
are required to take account of varying infectivity over the course of infection as discussed below. 
3. SIMULATIONS 
The initial simulations involved a population of 1250 people in a small community. The two infections’ 
states and the recovery and infection probabilities are shown in Table 1 for individuals in the simulations. 
Smallpox was eradicated in 1972 and current populations under the age about 40 would have no immunity. 
Even those over that age are unlikely to have been vaccinated except when travelling to prone areas and, in a 
bioweapons attack, the strain might not match the vaccination strains.  The immunity to smallpox was 
therefore assumed to be 10% for the population as a whole. While a more detailed model of immunity could 
be constructed, the approach taken was considered to be reasonable given the variation in other parameters. A 
similar value was used for immunity to pneumonic plague on the basis of sporadic natural outbreaks around 
the world leaving most of the world’s population vulnerable. The infection strength was varied to account for 
changes in infectivity during the course of the diseases. It was reduced to 50% during hero time to take 
account of the increasing infectivity during the symptomatic phase of plague. With smallpox, the most 
infectious period is the prodromal period and the infection strength decreases once the rash appears. 
The bioweapon infections were modelled as a static person in a cell who had a latency period that matched 
the time from the start of the simulation to the release of the weapon’s infection. This time was randomly 
selected from within a time window and the location was randomly selected from the workplaces in the 
simulation. The infectivity of the source was raised above 1.0, as shown in Table 1, to ensure a reasonable 
spread within the community in order that other effects of the two diseases could be studied.
4
 Other 
parameters came from analysis of outbreaks that had occurred for the two diseases. 
An analysis of generational infection in an outbreak of plague in Mukden, Manchuria in 1946 (Tieh et al, 
1946) is shown in Figure 3. In this outbreak 43 people were infected among 83 contacts. While the text did 
not explicitly state the contacts for the five that recovered, the text did allow identification of who was likely 
to have infected them.  The infection chance for the present study is based on the average infection rate 
through the population in this case study.  
Because the reproductive number (R0) in the literature for smallpox varied from 0 to 38 with a mean below 3 
(Bhatnagaret al, 2006), an outbreak in Abakaliki, Nigeria, in 1967 was chosen to calibrate the infection rate 
in a naïve population. In this outbreak, three population groups, a naïve population belonging to a Faith 
group, a vaccinated group who lived in close proximity to the Faith group and a more general population who 
also had a high vaccination rate were used. There was sufficient detail in the published outbreak to be able to 
reconstruct the populations, their immunological status and their housing communities (Thompson et al, 
1968, Ottenberg, 1960). The values for the infection in Table 1 were based upon this outbreak.  Simulation of 
the outbreak calibrated the infection chance and the other infection parameters. 
In the simulations, people who became infected with smallpox had a 50% chance of confinement to their 
home during the prodromal phase and 50% chance of confinement during the first observations of 
progression of the disease (Halloran, 2002). With plague there was no asymptomatic infectious stage and it 
was assumed that 50% of infectids would be home confined during hero time and 100% thereafter.  The 
variation in infection chance over the course of each disease increases the number of states required to 17 
compared with Figure 2.    
The initial simulations were undertaken to obtain a baseline for each infection separately. Figure 4 shows the 
results where infection was started in five locations over a two hour period, 12 hours into the simulation. 
Smallpox required lower infection strengths compared to plague to obtain infection of people in the locations. 
                                                          
4
This study is not concerned with the efficiency of weapons. Consequently, an infection chance was chosen 
that consistently produced spread within the community for the two diseases. 
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Table 1    Infection Parameters 
While smallpox tended to spread throughout the population, plague did not spread as much and exhibited 
bimodal behavior. The frequency between the two modes is shown in Figure 4: about 2/3
rd
 of simulations 
showed low propagation. This behavior seems to be relative to the number of people going through the 
release locations over the 2hr period the release was active. A larger population density might change this 
finding. 
Figure 5 shows the plague and smallpox outbreaks when there were five release points for each infection 
over the same time period and the interaction was not considered. The high plague propagation has about 30 
less infections on average than when it is the only disease and occurs for about 10 days longer. The smallpox 
numbers are very similar to the single infection numbers but the main rise in the curve occurs a few days 
later. Both infections are affected by home confinement reducing the susceptible population available for 
further infection by a second infection as there is no interaction between the infections in this simulation. 
Note that the plague still has bimodal behavior similar to the single outbreak in Figure 4, left.   
A second series of simulations involved adding interaction parameters between plague and smallpox. This 
was achieved by having two parameters controlling the change in recovery compared to no interaction for 
each of the two diseases. Figure 6 shows the results for adjusting the strength of the interaction when 
smallpox is caught first, leading to a reduction in the chance of death from plague. The simulations show that 
while there is a reduction in plague deaths due to the delay in the release of plague, it is not clear how the 
strength of the interaction between smallpox and plague is affecting the number of deaths.  
Since any interaction in a double infection simulated here has to occur within a certain time period from 
infection with smallpox, the number of smallpox cases that would influence the outcome of plague was 
extracted from the simulations. In Figure 7 two sets of data are plotted against the number of plague deaths 




 days of simulation: firstly the number of smallpox cases that result 
in an interaction together with a regression estimate of the trend and secondly the effect of the reduction in 
the chance of death.  The simulations show that the number of plague deaths depends on the delay in release 
of plague compared to smallpox as well as the strength of the interaction between the two diseases provided 
that there are enough smallpox cases where the interaction can make a difference. Increasing the number of 
available interactions does tend to decrease the number of deaths. 
4. DISCUSSION 
These preliminary simulations have shown that it is possible to construct a community based infection model 
based on individual spread of multiple diseases. In this case the two diseases, smallpox and plague, are 
assumed to interact through different channels in the innate immune system. Quite complex outcomes can be 
expected when more than one biological weapon is released into a conflict zone.  





Infectious  time 
Immune time 
(assumed) 
Infection chance  
Recovery chance  
Infection strength 
of infected people 
Infection strength 
of the initial 
infecting source 




62 ± 30 hours 
100000 hours 
 
0.0022 ± 0.0003 
0 - 0.1  
1 (0.5 during 
hero time) 
1000 
330 ± 48 hours 
50 ± 20 hours 
 
48 ± 13 hours 
420 ± 60 hours 
100000 hours 
 
0.01 ± 0.002 
0.6 - 0.7 
1 (0.2 during 
infectious time) 
10 
Figure 1 The Mukden plague outbreak 
1946                  
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Figure 4 Individual simulation of plague (left) and smallpox (right) 
 
Figure 5 simultaneous releases of plague and smallpox  
 
Figure 6 Deaths from Plague release 0 and 35 days    Figure 7 Number of smallpox infections that interact 
after start of simulation.    with plague infection released at 0 and 35 days. 
This has potential ramifications on emergency preparedness and practical steps that can be taken to reduce 
mortality and morbidity. 
Current WHO guidelines are based on accessible health professionals and the progress of individual diseases. 
They also assume point entry between countries rather than regional phased movement across porous 
borders. It also ignores two affects: the possibility of interaction between diseases (in this case through the 
innate immune system) and the human behavior constraints in delivery of health care. The latter affects the 
timing of the discovery of both diseases, the supply of drugs to the area, the presentation of patients at 
doctors’ clinics or hospitals and the reluctance of health workers to volunteer to go to conflict zones; 
particularly where approved preventative prophylaxis is not available, such as with plague.  
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The use of microsimulation has a benefit in that many of the human factors can be easily incorporated into 
the simulation without affecting the other components of the simulation. For example, vaccine and drug 
supply can be added as additional peeps that move to hospitals or doctors’ surgeries and then interact with the 
human population through creation of additional states based on these locations.  
Further work is planned to assess the impact of these human factors on preventing epidemic spread within 
and outside of conflict areas.   
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